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REVIEW ESSAY
TYBURN, THANATOS, AND MARXIST
HISTORIOGRAPHY: THE CASE OF THE
LONDON HANGED
CharlesJ Reid, Jr.t

INTRODUCTION

Peter Linebaugh's The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in
the Eighteenth Century1 is a powerfully written and passionately argued
book. Linebaugh's purpose is to understand the people who were
hanged at Tyburn, the public hanging ground of the City of London
for much of the eighteenth century. Linebaugh's sources for this history are primarily religious and legal-the Account of the Ordinary of
Newgate, 2 a sort of prison chaplain to the condemned, and the Sessions Papers of the London courts.3 From these records Linebaugh
t
Research Associate in Law and History, Emory University School of Law. B.A. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1978; J.D., The Catholic University of America, 1982;
J.C.L., The Catholic University of America, 1985; M.A., Cornell University, 1987. The comments and suggestions of David Bederman, Harold J. Berman, Bruce P. Frohnen, Russell
K. Osgood, William Joseph Wagner and John Witte, Jr. are gratefully acknowledged. This
essay is dedicated to the memory of James R. Cieslewicz, June 29, 1952-August 18, 1992.
1

PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CVL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHT-

(1992) [hereinafter THE LONDON HANGED].
2 Linebaugh draws the great bulk of his history from this periodical entitled The Ordinary of Newgate, His Account of the Behaviour,Confession, andDying Words of the Malefactors who
were Executed at Tyburn (Account) [hereinafter Account]. Linebaugh briefly discusses the Ordinary's Account as an historical source in THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at xix-xxi, 8991. Linebaugh has elsewhere provided a far more detailed analysis of this document. See
Peter Linebaugh, The Ordinary of Newgate and His Account, in CRIME IN ENGLAND: 15501800, at 246 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977). The Ordinary's Account was published periodically,
had the general appearance of a newspaper, and was sold publicly by street-hawkers. Id. at
247-48. The Account contained five basic sections: The first section described the trial of
the condemned; the second provided a synopsis of sermons the Ordinary preached to the
condemned; the third furnished biographical details of those about to be hanged; the
fourth allowed the condemned the opportunity to confess his or her crimes to the public;
and the final section described "the events of the hanging itself." Id. at 248.
3
Linebaugh relies upon the Sessions Papers of the London courts as a means of supplementing and confirming his account. For analyses of the Sessions Papers of the London
courts as historical documents, see John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Tria: A View from the Ryder Sources 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3-18 (1983) [hereinafter
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial];John H. Langbein, The Criminal
Trial Before the Lauyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 267-72 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers].
EENTH CENTURY
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constructs a sociology of the condemned-a project that he calls
4
"Tyburnography."
But Linebaugh's purposes are larger than merely reconstructing
the lives of those hanged at Tyburn. He uses his sources to build what
he calls a "history of making" and a "history of taking."5 Literally understood, it was the "working class" that made London, and it was the
working class whose members died on the gallows largely for taking
6
things that "belonged" to others.
Linebaugh finds ideas such as "making," "taking," and "belonging" to be controverted concepts in eighteenth-century England,
which leads him to consider the nature of eighteenth-century rule.
The eighteenth-century English state, Linebaugh argues, was a
"thanatocracy"-iterally, a government of death.7 It ruled by means
of the discipline inculcated by the gallows. 8 The spectacle of public
hanging was central to the maintenance of power by the English
elites. By focusing on the spectacle of the public hanging, and the
lessons the laboring poor were supposed to draw from it, Linebaugh
argues that even though fewer executions occurred in the eighteenth
than in the seventeenth century, the carrying out of capital punishment was of greater significance to the state.
In making these arguments Linebaugh adopts, quite forthrightly,
a Marxist analysis of history.9 According to the Marxists, eighteenthcentury England witnessed a growing class struggle between an urban
proletariat, dispossessed not only of landed property, but even of its
customary right to share in the fruit of its labor, and a propertied
ruling class that grew ever richer through the exploitation both of the
domestic working class and of that part of the non-Western world unlucky enough to fall under the control of English colonizers. This
struggle was played out in London through the criminalization of conduct that was formerly legal and the enforcement of an ever-expanding body of criminal law imposing capital penalties for offenses
against property. 10
4 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 89 ("As demography originated in records
designed to take private property under the sanction of public law (taxation),
Tyburnography is based on records designed to warn people to respect property when
privately taken against public law (hangings).").
5 Id at xxv.
6 See id. at xxi.
7 Id. at 50 ("[T]he term thanatocracy [means] ... a government that rule[s] by the
frequent exercise of the death penalty.").
8 Id. at xx.
9 Id. at xxii-xxiii.
10 Id. at xv-xxv. See generally Peter Linebaugh, (Marxist) Social History and (Conservative)
LegalHistory: A Reply to ProfessorLangbein, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 212 (1985) (defending a Marxist interpretation of eighteenth-century criminal law in England).
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Linebaugh's adoption of a Marxist framework for his analysis of
the "London hanged" has, however, at least three negative consequences: (1) it obscures the role of religious belief in the shaping of
eighteenth-century capital punishment; (2) it reduces the significance
of transportation as an alternative to capital punishment; and (3) it
caricatures the independence and integrity of the judges, juries, prosecutors, and counsel who participated in England's criminal justice
system.
Linebaugh, furthermore, wishes to avoid a crucial corollary of the
Marxist analysis: the contention that law is merely "superstructure,"
built upon a "foundation" of economic relations. The classical Marxist contends that there is no such thing as the "rule of law." The lawyer who believes that he or she is acting autonomously is deluded
since the law itself is a product of class interest." Contemporary
Marxist scholars, however, disagree on whether one can speak of a
rule of law,' 2 and Linebaugh believes that by taking as his starting
point the actual persons hanged at Tyburn he does not need to take
3
sides in this dispute.'
This review essay considers each of these issues in turn. Part I
asserts that while "Tyburnography" is probably the strongest part of
Linebaugh's book, "thanatocracy" is its Achilles' heel. Part II argues
11

HaroldJ. Berman has observed:

[L]aw for Marx and Engels is "superstructure," an unconscious or semiconscious ideological reflection of economic relations. "The economic structure of society," wrote Engels, "always forms the real basis from which, in
the last analysis, is to be explained the whole superstructure of legal and
political institutions, as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other
conceptions of each historical period." And again, "The jurist imagines
that he is operating with a prioriprinciples whereas they are really only economic reflexes."
HAROLDJ. BERMAN,JusTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOviET LAW 16 (rev. ed.
1963).
12

Compare E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERs: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-

69 (1975) (defending the rule of law) with MortonJ. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE LJ. 561 (1977) (Book Review arguing that law is not an "unqualified social good") and Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishismof Commodities,34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 998 (1985) ("There is ... a long tradition of
insisting that executive officers and judges under capitalism often twist, or plain break the
rules in order to do in oppressed groups, thereby furthering their class interests."). Linebaugh sees Thompson and Kennedy as representing an "antinomy" between the possibility
that law, and the rule of law can embody and serve transcendent purposes, on the one
hand, and the conception of law as power exercised to advance class interest on the other.
See THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at xxii-xxiii.
13 Linebaugh states:
"This [antinomy] can be a useful way to understand the problem.... But
this [antinomy] is limited and false, if not comic. Its starting-point is law
and its idol-like power to entrance the intellect. Our starting-point is
neither law nor 'critical law' but the hanged men and women whose views
and actions continually challenged both law and their own class."
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at xxiii.
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that Linebaugh's reliance on Marxist historiography distorts the role
played by religion and transportation in the criminal-justice system,
and unfairly characterizes the activities of such "decision-makers" as
juries and judges. Part III argues that it is not possible to avoid the
issue of the "rule of law" as easily as Linebaugh would like to, and that
he has, in fact, opted for the classical Marxist "superstructure-foundation" dichotomy. The review closes by reflecting briefly on the theme
of "Tyburnography Today." It assesses some lessons today's lawyers
might draw from eighteenth-century execution practices.
It must finally be noted that while this review will at points be
critical of Linebaugh's book, this criticism does not aim to detract
from the book's positive accomplishments. In assembling data about
eighteenth-century executions and economic conditions, Linebaugh
has performed a very useful scholarly service. His work is the product
of a long and intimate acquaintance with the sources and will stand as
a landmark in the history of capital punishment.
I
TYBURNOGRAPHY AND THANATocRAcy

A. Tyburnography
The strongest part of The London Hanged is Linebaugh's treat14
ment of "Tybumography." A conscious pun on "demography,"
Linebaugh's "Tybumography" is a close analysis of the "1,242 men
and women hanged on 243 hanging days in London between 1703
and 1772." 15 Relying chiefly on the periodical pamphlet, The Ordinary
of Newgate, His Account of the Behaviour, Confession, and Dying Words of the
Malefactors who were Executed at Tyburn,16 Linebaugh begins his story of
Tybumography with numbers-a deliberate effort at reducing the
"social significance of the individual.., to... statistical generalizations." 17 But "Tyburnography" is far more than a statistical account of
the London hanged. Rather, it uses statistical generalization as a canvas upon which to paint a vivid series of portraits of the ways particular
condemned men and women lived, the social background from which
they came, and the crimes for which they died.
This section of the review employs roughly the same method
Linebaugh utilizes to recount his story of the London hanged. It begins with statistics, but then moves on to the larger social background.
It will be seen that the London hanged formed an international, interracial group drawn largely from a surprisingly mobile working class
14

Id. at 88-89; see supra note 4.

15
16
17

Id. at 91.
For a discussion of this document, see supra note 2.
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 88.
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that in many ways helped to "make" London and were hanged for
crimes that amounted to unauthorized "taking."
More than 1242 people were hanged in London between 1703
8
and 1772; Linebaugh studies only a large cross-section of the total.'
Of this number, 483 were born in London, 429 were born in England
(outside of London), 171 were Irish, 30 Scottish, 21 Welsh, 42 were
born elsewhere, and 66 were of unknown origin. 19 As these numbers
suggest, the representatives of the London hanged Linebaugh examines were migratory and mobile. Annual death rates in eighteenthcentury London, thanks to poor sanitary conditions and periodic out20
breaks of diseases like typhoid and typhus, far exceeded birth rates.
Over these same years, however, the population of the London metropolis actually increased as it was replenished by newcomers arriving
from outside the city. Significant numbers of these new arrivals found
2
their way to the gallows. '
Furthermore, most of those hanged were members of what might
be broadly considered the urban working class.2 2 Newcomers and native Londoners alike worked at a variety of occupations. Butchers,
bakers, weavers, spinners, shoemakers, tailors, hatters, and wheelwrights were among the many occupations represented in the pages
of the Ordinary's Account.23 These were the people who in their daily
labors quite literally made the City of London.
The vast majority of the 1242 cases Linebaugh examines were
hangings for offenses against property. 24 Most convicts, like "Mary
Linebaugh explains this cross-section as follows:
I have studied 237 different issues of the Account describing 1,242 men and
women hanged on 243 hanging days in London between 1703 and 1772.
This is not a comprehensive figure. It amounts to an average of 3 or 4
hanging days a year, when, in fact, sometimes there were as many as 8 in a
single year (excluding special hangings), though 6 would be more common. Nor does my study include hangings that took place near London,
such as those Surrey hangings performed on Kennington Common. But
although the sample is not absolutely comprehensive, it is large enough
that patterns derived from it would not be much altered were the lacunae
in the evidence filled.
Id. at 91 (footnotes omitted).
18

19
20

Id. at 92.

21

Id.

Id. at 142 ("Demographically speaking, London in the early eighteenth century was
a killer because deaths far exceeded births.").
22 Id. at xxi. On the growth and development of the "working class" in eighteenthcentury England, see ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON, LIFE AND LABOUR IN ENGLAND, 1700-1780
(1981); JOHN RULE, THE LABOURING CLASSES IN EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, 1750-1850
(1986); E.P.

THOMPSON,

THE

MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS

(Vintage Books ed.

1963); E.P. Thompson, Eighteenth-Centur
2 English Society: Class Struggle Without Class, 3 Soc.
Hisr. 133 (1978).
23 Linebaugh supplies an exhaustive list of occupations in THE LONDON HANGED,
supra note 1, at 103-05.
24 Id. at 79.
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Goddard, hanged for picking a pocket," 25 had committed offenses
that were truly trivial. A few, like John Weskett, a domestic servant to
the Earl of Huntingdon who succeeded in bilking the Earl out of sev26
eral thousand pounds, had committed crimes of some seriousness.
Far scarcer were those hanged for committing crimes against the
27
person.
A large part of The London Hanged is devoted to exploring these
two themes: the migratory, even international, character of those executed at Tyburn, and the relationship between making and taking.
The richness and detail with which Linebaugh treats these themes is a
triumph of energetic, even dogged, research and a significant amount
of historical imagination. The next section addresses Linebaugh's explication of these themes.
1.

The Migratory and InternationalCharacterof the London Hanged

"On March 14, 1722 James Appleton, alias Appleby, alias John
Doe, age 29, was hanged for stealing three wigs." 28 We learn about
James Appleton that he first went to sea at the age of twelve, and that
he spent by far the largest part of the remaining seventeen years of his
life "before the mast." 29 The Ordinary tells his readers that Appleton
had been treated with extreme severity while serving as a sailor:
[He was] scourged and lashed and salted which hardn'd his Mind,
and made him hate and defy almost all Mankind. So that returning
to England... he cast his Mind how most easily to keep himself at
the Expense of others, and by spoiling and preying on all whom he
30
thought he could with security.
At least seventy-six sailors were hanged at Tyburn between the
years 1703-1772.31 Many had careers not unlike that of James Appleton's. By anecdotally recounting the life and death struggles ofJames
Appleton and others like him, Linebaugh sheds light on the harsh
25

26
27

Id. at 144.
Id. at 249-50.
Linebaugh's treatment of those hanged for crimes against the person is relatively

thin. On at least one occasion, Linebaugh leaves the impression that a condemned party
was hanged for an offense against property when in fact the crime was against the person.
See Keith Thomas, How BritainMade It, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Nov. 19, 1992, at 35,38 ("[Linebaugh] lists one John Masland as an example of a sailor brought to Tyburn by unemployment .... He does not tell us that Masland was hanged for rape and had been guilty of
child abuse, infecting his own daughter with venereal disease.").
28
29
3o

THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
Id.

31
The number of 76 is arrived at by adding 39, the number of Irish sailors hanged at
Tyburn and 37, the number of English sailors born outside of London. The actual number
of sailors hanged at Tyburn no doubt was more than 76, since Linebaugh does not provide
figures for sailors born in London, or for non-English or non-Irish sailors hanged at Tyburn. See THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 95, 97.
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conditions of maritime service, and the use of execution as a means of
32
enforcing a strict discipline.
The sailor's lot was "a damned hard life, full of strife." 33 Drawn
from a variety of different walks of life,3 4 sailors were thrown together
for months at a time, sleeping in berths sometimes no more than fourteen inches wide. The work was dangerous. Large numbers of sailors
died of disease or were killed in shipboard accidents. 35 Shipboard
work was also demanding. The sailor had to be dexterous in a wide
variety of skills, from tying knots to climbing rigging.36 Prematurely
aged by the demands of nautical life, many sailors were rendered unfit
to serve by their late thirties or early forties, and were often forced to
37
lead destitute lives on shore.
The crew, furthermore, had to work as a team. Breakdowns in
discipline could pose great danger to the officers, to the ship's mission, and even to the lives of all on board. Breaches of discipline were
accordingly treated harshly. Flogging, keel-hauling, and other forms
of frequently lethal corporal punishment were generously administered by captains given largely unchecked powers to discipline
38
transgressions.
Made to lead ascetic, if not spartan, shipboard lives, sailors posed
a threat to good order on shore. They were "lords of six weeks" apt to
cause all sorts of problems:
You may ... see them accompanied with three or four Lewd Wo-

men, few of them Sober, run roaring through the streets by broad
Daylight with a Fiddler before them: And if the Money, to their

32

Id. at 122-38.

33

MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN,

PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD,

1700-1750, at 14 (1987) (quoting the

journal of Edward Barlow, a seventeenth-century sailor).
34

On the social background of sailors, see id. at 12-14; RALPH DAVIS, THE RISE OF THE
SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 110-32

ENGLISH

(1962). A large number of men were involuntarily impressed into naval service. See
(1965).

DANIEL A. BAUGH, BRITISH NAVAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE 160-62
35
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 130-31. Ralph Davis has observed:

The seafaring life was ...a dangerous one. Most seamen who left their life
stories have some story of wreck, fire or accident, of which they were the
lucky survivors, to relate. If the annual rate of loss of ships by wreck and
burning was as much as four per cent, and it might well be more, the
chances of a seaman ending his life in such a catastrophe were high; and
many a man fell from the rigging, was washed overboard, or was fatally
struck by falling gear.
DAVIS, supra note 34, at 156.
36
37

38

supra note 1, at 130.
Id. at 126. See DAVIS, supra note 34, at 156-57.
See, e.g., REDIKER, supra note 33, at 212-13.
THE LONDON HANGED,
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thinking, goes not fast enough these ways, they'll find out others,
39
and sometimes fling it among the Mob by handfuls.
While flogging and keel-hauling were means of maintaining shipboard order, hanging was a means of maintaining order on shore.
The number of indictments issued ebbed and flowed with the arrival
of the West Indian and East Indian merchant fleets, 40 and a certain
41
number of sailors were regularly hanged as "examples" to others.
Soldiers also figured among those hanged at Tyburn. Prominent
among the soldiers executed at Tyburn were "Wild Geese," Irish mer42
cenaries who fought in many of the wars of the eighteenth century.
In a migration that commenced in earnest with the Irish defeat at the
Battle of the Boyne, many Irishmen travelled to the Continent and
enlisted in the armies of France, Spain, Russia, and Poland, while
others crossed the Atlantic and fought in the American War for Independence or sided with Simon Bolivar in the Latin American wars for
independence. 4 3 Mindful of the depredations Oliver Cromwell and
other Englishmen visited upon the Emerald Isle, large numbers of
"Wild Geese" made it a point to enlist in the service of any principality
44
opposed to British interests.
Eight percent of the Irish executed at Tyburn were "Wild
Geese." 45 Some, like Thomas Reynolds, hanged on November 7,
1750, served as mercenaries for political reasons. Others, like John
Cassady, fought only as a way of supporting themselves, and quite eagerly allied with Protestants in the London underground. 4 6 What
Reynolds, Cassady, and others like them had in common, however,
was the experience of brutalizing combat in battles that left thousands
dead and wounded from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and across
47
the Atlantic to the New World.
Linebaugh, however, says more than simply that sailors and
soldiers had particularly brutalizing experiences in their respective
callings and subsequently figured prominently among those hanged
at Tyburn. He also asserts that sailors and soldiers formed elements of
a culture that was international, even cosmopolitan, in its own right,
39 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting BERNARD DE MANDEVLLE, THE
FABLE OF THE BEES 207 (rev. ed. 1970)).
40
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 131-33.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 297.
43
See generally MAURICE HENNESSY, THE WILD GEESE: THE IRISH
(1973) (assessing the international role played by Irish mercenaries).
44 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 300.
45
Id. at 297.
46
Id. at 300.
47
Id. at 299-300.
41

42

SOLIDER IN EXILE
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both distinct from and opposed to the dominant British culture. He
has, to a significant extent, succeeded in making this case.
Sailors spoke a brand of English nearly undecipherable to those
not familiar with it.48 They formed a tightly-knit group with distinctive
customs, including even distinctive marriage practices, and were
deeply suspicious of outsiders. 49 English merchant and naval crews
were broadly international in their composition, including not only
native Englishmen, but also continental Europeans and Africans. Africans, indeed, played an important part in eighteenth-century mari51
time culture, 50 and were also among those hanged at Tyburn.
The Irish constituted a second element in this "oppositional culture." Largely Roman Catholic, the Irish in London were separated
from the English by religion as well as by language. Although often
surprisingly well-educated (some Irish laborers executed at Tyburn
knew both Latin and Greek), many Irish residents of London
shunned regular work and did not share the "Protestant work ethic"
of the English. 52 The Irish were especially contemptuous of execution
and their practice of celebrating the wakes of executed men and women with drinking and festivity grew up as a way demonstrating
5
indomitability. 3
So far so good. That sailors, soldiers, and the Irish comprised
distinct communities variously at odds with the mainstream seems
clear. Linebaugh, however, wishes to take his argument one step further by contending that sailors and soldiers and other workers were
"exploited" in the sense that they were excluded from sharing in the
means of production.5 4 Their collective experience of oppression
48

Id. at 134-35; Peter Linebaugh, All the Atlantic Mountains Shook, 10 LABouR/LE
87, 109-11 (1982). Cf William Matthews, Sailors' Pronunciation in the Second
Half of the Seventeenth Century, 59 ANGLA: ZEITSCHRIFr FOR ENGLISCHE PHILOLOGIE 193

TRAVAILLEUR

(1935). Marcus Rediker has observed: "Language, a pivotal part of any culture, held a
special significance in the wooden world, the solitary vessel of seafaring life. To learn and
finally to master the peculiar argot of the sea was to become a seaman." See REDIKER, supra
note 33, at 162.
49
On "marriages of the Fleet," see THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 141-42; on
the cohesiveness of sailors generally, see REDIKER, supra note 33, at 288-98.
50 See Linebaugh, supra note 48, at 108-10.
51
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 135-36.
52
53
54

Id. at 293.
Id. at 325-26.

Linebaugh states:
Men and women of the eighteenth century wanted money, most certainly.
This is not quite the same, however, as the enthusiastic embrace of wagelabour which was so often accompanied by the kiss of death. As for "the
needs of capitalism" one might recall, indeed, the words "Capital is dead
labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the
more, the more labour it sucks", or "Accumulate, accumulate! That is
Moses and the prophets!"
Id. at xxiv (quoting KARL MARx, DAS KAPrrAL 216, 600 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976)).
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consequently endowed them with a class consciousness that allowed
them to challenge the capitalist classes which were beginning to consolidate power in England. Tyburn thus became a stage upon which
class oppressors might teach docility to the proletariat, even while the
occasional brave soul might shout defiance.
This argument will be dealt with more fully below. 55 It suffices

here to note that the differences and the frictions that existed between different classes and groups need not be evidence of class struggle in a Marxian sense. Consistent with their belief that labor is the
only source of value in the production of commodities, Marxians understand exploitation to exist and class struggle to be necessarily present whenever the means of production are not held in common. 56
But work in a capitalist system need not be viewed as necessarily exploitive. Work is a basic human need, a source of individual identity,
and an expression of "our human essence."5 7 Even members of an
"oppositional culture" need to satisfy the human urge to work, not
only to survive, but also to create a sense of identity. The solidarity of
sailors, even those impressed into service, or the camaraderie of mercenaries, even those forced to fight by economic hardship, need not
be evidence of resistance to class oppression, but rather a sign of
shared identity and purpose and a suspicion, if not contempt, for
those who have not shared the risks and the exhilaration of good-seamanship or soldiering. This alternative reading of "oppositional culture" does not excuse those who took advantage of the poor and
destitute, nor does itjustify the savagery that was often shown to them;
but it does suggest that class struggle in the Marxian sense may not be
the most fruitful basis from which to analyze the differences and frictions found among the various groups and classes of eighteenth-century London.
2.

Making and Taking in Eighteenth-Century London

In February 1722, James White was convicted of stealing twentyeight pounds of tobacco from Micajah Perry and forty pounds of tobacco from William Dawkins. White was transported to the American
colonies to serve a sentence of seven years forced labor. 58 He managed to jump ship in Jamaica during his transport and subsequently
made his way first to the American colonies and then back to England
55
56

See infra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
See SIDNEY HooK, TOWARDs THE UNDERSTANDING OF KARL MARx: A REVOLUTIONARY

INTERPRETATION 200-07
57 JOHN C. RAINES

(1933).

& DONNA C.

DAY-LOWER, MODERN WORK AND HUMAN MEANING 15
(1986). Raines and Day-Lower note that work remains a basic human need even where the
work environment is an "alienated" one. Id. at 16. Cf A. R.Gini & T. Sullivan, Work The

Process and the Person, 6J. Bus. ETHIcs 649 (1987).
58
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 153-54.
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in December 1722. Apprehended in October 1723, White was hanged
59
for violating the Transportation Act.

In the 1720s, a period of English history that would see the ascendancy of Robert Walpole and the "Robinocracy" in English politics, 60
as well as James White's hanging, Micajah Perry was undergoing a financial crisis. One of the wealthiest tobacco merchants in the Anglophone world, Perry suffered serious business losses as the result of
a general depression in prices brought about in part by "gross frauds
and abuses" that had crept into the tobacco trade. 61 Perry responded
to his personal financial crisis by bribing custom officials to shortweight his tobacco imports into England to reduce his duty. 62 When

his losses continued, he petitioned the House of Commons to restrict
the trade of his competitors, the Scottish tobacco merchants of Glasgow. Perry survived the crisis and later was elected first to Parliament
63
and then to the lord-mayoralty of London.
The irony is palpable. White, the small-time thief, is hanged,
while Perry, the merchant who cheats on a grand scale, gains status
within the British mercantile establishment. Who was the greater
thief? It is this paradox that Linebaugh explores with considerable
success in his treatment of making and taking. The makers of
London, according to Linebaugh, were the working classes. Butchers,
shoemakers, tailors, watchmakers, silk weavers, hatters, coal-heavers,
itinerant laborers, and domestic servants were among the many occupations responsible for building London, meeting its daily needs, and
outfitting the "better" classes. They also comprised the large majority
of the London hanged.
In the last years of the seventeenth century and the opening years
of the eighteenth, much of the compensation provided such workers
was customary and "in-kind." Hatters, for instance, might engage in
"bugging," taking a beaver pelt or other premium fur intended for a
hat and substituting an inferior material. 64 Tailors, similarly, might
take "cabbage," scraps of cloth of greater or lesser size left over from a
particular job. 65 Those engaged in the tobacco trade might practice

"socking," keeping a certain customary amount of tobacco for perId. at 154.
The regime of Robert Walpole received the title "Robinocracy" because of its perceived corruption. Id. at 115. See, e.g., LEwis NAmIER, THE STRUCrURE OF BRrIsH PoLTcs
AT THE AccEssION OF GEORGE III (2d ed. 1957). This view of Walpole has been substantially
qualified byJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 765-66 n.76 (1984).
61 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 158.
59
60

62

Id. at 155-56.

63

Id. at 155. Perry's career did not meet with uniform success. SeeJAcoB M. PRIcE,

PERRY OF LONDON: A FAMILY AND A Firm ON THE SEABORNE FRONTIER, 1615-1753, at 63-90

(1992).
64

THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 237-39.

65

Id. at 245-48.
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sonal use or for resale. 66 Household servants, for their part, jealously
67
guarded the "perquisites" and "vails" that went with their positions.
Still other occupations had their own customary takings, usually related to the trade they were practicing. 68 Generally speaking, these
practices display notions of property and compensation that were ambiguous and fluid, thus allowing the laboring classes to share directly
in the fruits of their labor.
This situation changed in the course of the eighteenth century as
rights-bearers were steadily purged of their customary rights. The
means of deprivation took various shapes. In the tobacco trade, for
instance, laborers were deprived of their customary rights by the enactment by Parliament of the Bulk Container Act in 1699, requiring
that all tobacco shipped across the Atlantic be contained in a large
barrel called a "hogshead." The chief purpose in enacting the bill,
according to its supporters, was the curtailment of "presumptive Custom" and "accustomed privilege." 69 "Bugging" was made the repeated
target of parliamentary legislation in the 1740s and again in the
1770s. 70 Likewise, gentlemen and ladies of proper breeding steadily
sought, in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, to reduce
the amount of the "perquisites" and "vails" their domestic servants
66 Id. at 170-76.
67 Perquisites and vails were sources of monetary and non-monetary income, in addition to a salary, that related to the particular tasks of the servant. Id. at 250-55. For example, the "butler customarily received old bottles and candle-ends." Id. at 251.
68 Dockyard workers, for instance, practiced the custom of taking "chips," fragments
of wood used in the manufacture of ships. See id. at 378-82. Cf E. P. THOMPSON, CUsrOMS
IN COMMON 97184 (1991); BOB BUSHAWAY, By RITE: CusroM, CEREMONY AND COMMUNITY
IN ENGLAND, 1700-1880 (1982). Customary takings were part of a larger economic world
view that was under assault in the eighteenth century. What one saw in eighteenth-century
England was a conflict between two types of manufacture: one small-scale and diffuse,
centered upon the family as the basic means of production (called generally the "putting
out" system, since those who wanted work done would contract-"put out"-the work with
the families that agreed to perform it), the other large and impersonal, based on a central
workplace at which employees would perform their particular tasks (a forerunner of the
"factory" system). Customary takings were part of the fabric of small-scale domestic production. Craig Becker provides a helpful discussion of the legal implications of customary
takings within the "putting out" system:
During the early stages of the transformation of small-scale domestic
production, workers had significant legal, customary, and functional interests in the materials they processed. Under the common law, it was not
larceny or any other criminal offense for workers to take materials over
which they had been given physical custody. Workers in many industries
customarily appropriated some more or less explicitly defined portion of
their materials. The legal and customary status of such "takings" augmented workers' autonomy within the putting-out system. Confiscation
gave labor a distinct form and degree of control over both its remuneration
and the work process.
Craig Becker, Property in the Workplace: Labor, Capital, and Crime in the Eighteenth-Century
British Woolen and Worsted Industry, 69 VA. L. REv. 1487, 1490 (1983).
69 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 160.
70 Id. at 238-41.
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might claim, either by negotiating strict terms of employment or by
71
agreeing among themselves not to satisfy certain "customary" claims.
72
Only "cabbage" seems to have survived into the nineteenth century.
In this way, the earlier ambiguities of compensation were clarified
and earlier customary practices criminalized. "Socking" is an example
of the process of clarification and criminalization at work. While
James White was apparently the only laborer to have hanged in the
1720s for asserting what were once his customary rights to socking
(and he hanged for violating the Transportation Act, not the Bulk
Container Act), 73 many others were certainly punished for taking
what had arguably been theirs only a few years before. "Bugging" is
another example of the criminalization of a customary taking. Linebaugh reminds his readers that in the mid-eighteenth century the
ownership of the fur used in the manufacture of hats was disputed,
and that the "Bugging Acts" were intended not only to clarify ownership but to outlaw customary practice.74
It is this documentation of the ways in which the ambiguities surrounding eighteenth-century conceptions of property were clarified
that is a particular strength of The London Hanged. Linebaugh also
helpfully situates these transformations within the larger context of
eighteenth-century economic developments. Eighteenth-century Britain has been described variously as undergoing an "industrial revolution"75 or as witnessing the birth of a "consumer society." 76 However
one characterizes eighteenth-century Britain, it is clear that vast economic changes were taking place, and in the specific area of wages,
there was a steady movement away from in-kind compensation to com77
pensation tendered exclusively in the form of cash.
Linebaugh sees this shift as having a decidedly negative impact
on the working class. The informal takings previously enjoyed by
workers provided a useful means of cushioning their lot in life.
Wages, on the other hand, were quantitatively fixed and certain, and
their fixed nature often led to a reduction in a worker's standard of
living. This intensified the class struggle as workers, desperate from
71
72
73

Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 170.

Id. at 239-40.
75 The expression "industrial revolution" was coined by Arnold Toynbee in 1884.
Toynbee's lectures on the subject have been reprinted as TOYNBEE'S INDUSTRIAL REVOLU74

TION

76

(1969).
See generally NEIL

McKENDRICK ET AL., THE BIRTH OF A CONSUMER SOCIETr.

THE

COMMERCIALIZATION OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1982); P. G. M. DICKSON, THE FINANcIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND:

A

STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC CREDIT,

1688-

1756 (1967).
77

See RICHARD BROwN, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN MODERN BRAIN,

13 (1991).

1700-1850, at 312-
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their economic plight, angry at the loss their of rights, and resentful at
the new class distinctions, were driven to commit crimes against property which in turn led them to the gallows.
The final phase of this shift occurred in the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth, as new emphasis
was placed on both efficiency and law enforcement. Linebaugh uses
the careers of Samuel Bentham (Jeremy's brother), Inspector-General
of Naval Works, and Patrick Colquhoun, "receiver" for the Thames
River Police, to illustrate these developments. 7s
Bentham was named Inspector-General in 1795, twenty-three
years after the terminus of Linebaugh's "Tyburnography." Nevertheless, Bentham's career is important to Linebaugh's argument as a
means of showing how some trends evident in the years 1703-1772
played out. Bentham's great quest as Inspector-General was efficiency. Shipyard workers were accustomed to taking "chips"-pieces
of timber used in shipbuilding-as in-kind compensation, even
though this practice had a deleterious effect on the quality of ships
thereby produced.7 9 Bentham sought to eliminate this practice and
limit compensation to the existing level of cash payments. Bentham
was in no way concerned that the elimination of chips might lead to a
general reduction in the standard of living of workers. In fact, he
thought that such living-standard reductions would be a good way of
stimulating industriousness among the working classes.8 0 Bentham
also saw some additional usefulness in manipulating wage levels. Concerned with increasing output, his system of compensation was intended to create different wage levels based on performance. 8 '
Bentham's actions, Linebaugh suggests, were the result of his "com2
mit[ment] to crush[ ] the power of shipyard workers."
Patrick Colquhoun, who held an ambiguously defined position
with the Thames River Police, played an important role in designing a
modern police force for the City of London. As such, Colquhoun also
participated in the class struggle. As Linebaugh puts it: "If a single
individual could be said to have been the planner and theorist of class
struggle in the metropolis it would be he. Melville Lee called him the
'architect' of the police. The Webbs called him its 'inventor.' "83
78 For a discussion of Bentham's career, see THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at
396-401. Sir Leon Radzinowicz provides an extensive biography of Patrick Colquhoun at 3
A HISTORY or ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND Irs ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 211-51 (1957).
Colquhoun was a Glasgow businessman who left Scotland under mysterious circumstances
in 1789. His position with the Thames River Police, which he assumed in 1792, was, it
seems, always left deliberately vague. I. at 211-14.
79
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 390.
80 Id. at 396.
81 Id. at 399.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 427.
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Among their other duties, the police enforced the wage system by
monitoring the comings and goings of shipyard workers and searching them for now-illicit takings. The police were even charged with
enforcing a dress code designed to eliminate hidden pockets and
84
other devices that might be used for concealing "improper" takings.
Historians have long debated whether the economic compensation extended to the working class was rising or declining in the latter
years of the eighteenth century. 5 In focusing attention on the role
played by the criminal law in the attack on customary takings and in
suggesting that the standard of living was thereby diminished, Linebaugh has offered a new and fresh perspective on this question.
Again, however, as the description of Patrick Colquhoun as the chief
"planner and theorist" of the class struggle would indicate, Linebaugh's argument is distorted by its Marxist prism. The Marxian concept of class struggle rests fundamentally on Karl Marx's assertion that
only labor has value and that management and capital add nothing.
Profit thus represents an illegitimate surplus that the class of capitalists aggregates to itself.86 The class struggle arises from the competition over this surplus and the consequent need to keep wages
artificially low in order to maximize the surplus. On this analysis, the
laboring classes of London were exploited, and the ritual of public
87
hanging was meant to keep them that way.
But one need not rely on Marx for one's interpretation of eighteenth-century economic developments. One might turn instead to
Adam Smith 88 who wrote not only on the subject of economics, "making and taking," to use Linebaugh's expression, but also on the general question of what constitutes the morally just society. In his
84
85

Id. at 430.
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 77, at 315-17;

WALTER

W.

ROSTOW, THEORIES OF

Eco-

NOMIC GROWTH FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT 131-32 (1990).

86

See HOOK, supra note 56:

Like all commodities the use-value of labor-power is different from its exchange-value. But in one respect it is absolutely unlike other commodities.
Its specific use-value lies in the fact that it creates more exchange-value than
it is itself worth. If labor-power produced no more exchange-value than
what it receives in money wages, then the value of the commodities produced would be equal merely to the value of the raw material, machinery
and labor-power which entered into its manufacture. Where would profit
come in?... [The capitalist] can remain in business only so long as there is
a difference between the value of the labor-power he has purchased and
the values which that labor-power creates.
Id. at 201. Cf RosTow, supra note 85, at 130-34 (arguing that Marx misunderstood the
relationship between profits and wages because he failed to detect the steady rise in wages
in England during his lifetime).
87 It follows logically that only by holding the means of production in common is the
problem of surplus value eliminated, since the value of the commodities produced would
then equal the labor expended in production.
88 The few quotations to Smith found in THE LONDON HANGED are caricatures. See,
e.g., THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 97.
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economic thought, Smith rejected the then-prevalent belief that economic competition was a zero-sum game, proposing instead that surplus capital might be a key to economic growth. 9 In his moral
thought, Smith proposed that the good society consisted not of unrestrained, "greedy" capitalist exploiters, but of self-interested economic
actors who would nevertheless be tightly constrained in their behavior
by their practice of virtuous self-restraint.9 0 Generous compensation
to workers was one manifestation of the virtuous conduct expected of
the "capitalists."9 1
A "Smithian" view of eighteenth-century class relations would recognize that class relations were not necessarily adversarial and that
capitalists were themselves among the "makers" of London. It would
also provide a moral basis upon which to condemn "passionate," unrestrained behavior that betrayed the virtues one was expected to practice. The imposition of capital punishment for minor infractions
might thus be condemned as immoral. While Adam Smith is hardly
the final word on either economics or moral reasoning, such an approach might produce both a sounder analysis of "Tybumography"
and a sturdier foundation on which to criticize the harsh treatment of
property offenders.
B.

Thanatocracy

Despite its Marxist framework, "Tyburnography" is The London
Hanged's greatest strength. It provides the reader with a thorough
and subtly drawn picture of the social backgrounds of those who were
89

See, e.g., Rosrow, supra note 85, at 35.

90

SeeJERRY Z. MULLER, ADAM SMITH IN His TIME AND OuRs: DESIGNING THE DECENT

Socmmr 93-98 (1993). Muller stresses that Smith saw himself as much a moral philosopher
as an "economist." Muller calls Smith's vision of society "commercial humanism." Muller
states:
Smith was not the first to suggest that commerce promoted the development of more 'civilized' behavior-that was almost a commonplace of
eighteenth-century enlightened thought. But perhaps no other thinker devoted as much attention to describing how the market and commercial society could be structured to develop that constellation of self-control,
industry, and gentleness which moralists from the humanists through David
Hume had valued.
Id. at 95 (footnote omitted). Cf MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM
77-80 (1982) (interpreting Smith as proposing an economic system offering freedom for
human creativity, so that the accumulated ideas of individuals would create a mass
rationality).
91 Smith stressed that it was "but equity" to provide amply for one's employees. Furthermore, Smith argued, generous compensation had its rewards. "[W] here wages are high
... we shall always find the workman more active, diligent and expeditious than when they
are low. ... " BRowN, supra note 77, at 314 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
73 (Everyman ed., 1910)).
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hanged from London's "fatal tree." "Thanatocracy,"92 on the other
hand, is probably the book's most significant weakness.
Linebaugh's discussion of "Thanatocracy" has two components.
First, he asserts that in the eighteenth century the British theory of
sovereignty changed in a way that made capital punishment central to
its definition. Second, he maintains that the administration of the
death penalty was structured in a way designed to teach the "humbler"
classes to be docile before their rulers. Tyburn became, in effect, a
theater meant to teach obedience and respect. Both of these assertions will be analyzed in turn.
1. Political Power and the Death Penalty
Linebaugh puts his discussion of political power and
"Thanatocracy" in a literally diabolical context: The Pandaemoniumof
John Milton's ParadiseLost. The devils Moloch, Belial, and Mammon
appear in turn and each represent a different aspect of the new British empire. Moloch, the warrior, appears first. Moloch is metaphorically responsible for the vast and violent extension of the British
Empire in the seventeenth century, bringing warfare and destruction
to "five continents and seven seas. ''93 Belial, the intellectual, appears
next. Belial is the counsellor lacking in principle; in Milton's words,
Belial "could make the worse appear It] he better reason." 9 4 Belial provides the intellectual foundation to the diabolical new order by proposing a new theory of political power based on capital punishment.
Mammon, the acquisitive one, appears last. Mammon is concerned
with profits and productivity and stands for the subversion and destruction of guilds and other organizations protective of the working
classes, their replacement by a new and centralized means of organizing labor, and the creation of an exposed and vulnerable working
class. 95
Let us focus on Belial. Belial stands particularly for two late seventeenth-century intellectuals, William Petty and John Locke who, according to Linebaugh, were the ones who spun the intellectual
justifications for the new age. Of the two, Linebaugh sees Locke as
the more important: "Petty was a rough intellectual tailor. 'Reason's
garb' found a far more brilliant and fashionable tailor in John
Locke." 96 Locke proposed a new understanding of political power
centered on government's power to declare capital crimes:
92
93
94

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 47.
Id. at 48 (quotingJoHN MILToN, PARADISE LOST 11 109-17).

95

Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 49.
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Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and, consequently, all less penalties for the regulating
and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the9 7 execution of such laws .. . and all this only for the
public good.

This definition is crucially important to Linebaugh's understanding of "thanatocracy."9 8 The fact that Elizabethan England witnessed
a far higher execution rate than Hanoverian England is immaterial to
Linebaugh's argument. What matters to Linebaugh is the new relationship struck between capital punishment and sovereignty: "[I] t is
not the rate of hanging but the definition of sovereignty in terms of it
and its exercise in close calibration with money that requires
emphasis."99
Two objections may be made to this argument. First, it misrepresents Locke's thinking on sovereignty. As Linebaugh himself concedes, the relationship between capital punishment and sovereignty is
not well known.1°° This relative obscurity is the result of the relationship's unimportance to Locke's theory of government. The quotation
Linebaugh relies upon is drawn from the opening paragraphs of
Locke's Second Treatise on Government, in a section summarizing the
main arguments of the First Treatise. Locke provides a fuller discussion
of political power toward the close of the Second Treatise.1°1 In that
discussion, Locke proposes that political power arises from the consent of the governed, and that the chief purpose of political power is
the preservation of the lives and property of society's members.
Crimes may be punished consistent with this purpose, but the punishment must not be arbitrary. Locke does not specify the form of punishment, but he does refer to the need to "cut[ ] off those parts, and
those parts only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound
10 2
and healthy."
Id. at 50 (quotingJOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, ch. one).
98 Describing this passage from Locke, Linebaugh states: "The movement of ideas is
from property to law, from law to death, and from death to the public good." THE LONDON
97

HAlcED, supra note 1, at 50.

99
100

Id.
Id. at 49.
101 The First Treatise on Government was composed in the mid- to late-1680s and had as
its purpose the refutation of Robert Filmer's Scripture-based arguments in favor of absolute monarchy. Locke relies on Scripture heavily in his reply to Filmer and simply does not
make capital punishment a central feature of his treatment of political power. SeeJOHN
LOCKE, Two TRE.A-sEs ON GOVERNMENT 136-263 (1988).

102

Locke asserts:
Politicalpower is that power which every man having in the state of nature
has given up into the hands of the society and therein to the governors
whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust that it
shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property.
Now this power which every man has in the state ofnature and which he parts
with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to
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Capital punishment simply does not occupy a central position in
Locke's discussion of political power. If one assumes "cutting off
parts" refers to the imposition of capital punishment,10 3 one can easily
substitute for this phrase an alternative expression such as "impose
criminal sanctions according to the norm of law." Locke's "political
power," accordingly, should be understood as the power of the community, exercised by the community's representatives, to protect life
and property. Pursuant to this end, the community may, but need
not, impose the death penalty on those threatening the health of the
10 4
community.
A second and more important objection goes to the enduring
significance Linebaugh ascribes to Locke's theory of sovereignty.
Linebaugh seems to assume that Locke's definitions of political power
and sovereignty met with universal, or at least widespread assent in the
eighteenth century.' 0 5 This is not true. Locke was a polemicist and a
partisan whose views remained controversial both in his own time and
subsequently. 10 6 Other political theorists offered lively competition to
any supposed Lockean hegemony. Perhaps the most important of
these was Edmund Burke.
Edmund Burke was a lawyer and politician who was actively engaged in public affairs during much of the period in question. Burke
was a reflective man who attempted to conform his public career to
use such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good
and nature allows him, and to punish the breach of the law of nature in
others so as according to the best of his reason, may most conduce to the
preservation of himself and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure
of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the
preservation of all of his society-that is, all mankind in general-it can
have no other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrate but to
preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute arbit-ary power over their lives and
fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved, but a power to make
laws, and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the preservation of
the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt
that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And this power has its originalonly from compact and agreement and the

mutual consent of those who make up the community.
Id. at 381-82.
A recent and comprehensive study of Locke's views on capital punishment has
reached similar conclusions. See Brian Calvert, Locke on Punishmentand the DeathPenalty, 68
PHILOSOPHY 211 (1993). According to Calvert, Locke restricts "[e]xecution... to the most

desperate cases, where no adequate security can be provided against someone who poses a
constant threat." Id. at 229.
103
Such an assumption is not automatic given the new reliance placed on transportation beginning in the 1690s. See ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775,
104
See supra note 102.
105
See THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 50.

106

at 11-45 (1987).

"The actual, historical Locke was a political partisan deeply involved in the strug-

gles of his age." RUSSELL KRY, THE CONSERVATIVE CoNsTrrrrToN 66 (1990).
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his own evolving and publicly expressed political philosophy. 10 7 He
has been recognized by contemporary scholars as one of the founders
08
of the philosophical movement known generally as "conservatism.'
Burke's philosophy stressed the organic continuity of society. Society is a partnership of the generations, extending over time, to include not only the present generation, but also the dead and unborn.
Change in such a partnership should come slowly, and should remain
faithful to society's traditional principles because "[h]istory is a proving ground, testing institutions through circumstance and so producing the wisdom of the ages."' 0 9 As a result, Burke rejected Locke's
contention that societies were formed through an exchange of consent by free actors exercising natural rights. Indeed, abstract natural
rights meant very little to Burke, although Burke was quick to defend
against the violation of political and legal rights belonging to particular groups of persons. 110
Burke differed with Locke as well on the hierarchical nature of
society. According to Burke, the Crown and the aristocracy occupied
positions of leadership by virtue of the historical status of their offices,
and they were expected to discharge their responsibilities with the solemnity and seriousness that came with their state in life. But persons
of all stations were expected to lead lives of "accepting virtue" by acknowledging the circumstances of their lives and responding
appropriately."'
What is important in this account of Burke's thought is what is
not said. One would search in vain for any evidence that Burke saw
capital punishment as essential to his definition of sovereignty. This is
not to say that Burke was opposed to capital punishment; he could
enthusiastically endorse its administration in the appropriate circumstances. 1 2 Rather, Burke's theory of political power, resting on his107

For biographical detail on Edmund Burke, see generally CONOR CRUISE O'BmREN,

THE GREAT MELODY. A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND

BURKE

108

(1992).

Burke's "conservatism" was firmly rooted in the dominant English legal philosophy

of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "historical jurisprudence."

See Harold J.

Berman, The Origins of HistoricalJurispnidence:Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE LJ. 1651 (1994).
On Burke's conservatism generally, see BRUCE P. FROHNEN, VIRTUE AND THE PROMISE OF
CONSERVATISM: THE LEGACY OF BURKE AND TOCQUEVILLE (1992); KIPuK, supra note 106;

J.G.A. PococE, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND
(1971).
109 FROHNEN, supra note 108, at 51.
110
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118 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
111 FROHNEN, supra note 108, at 65-71.
112 Thomas W. Laqueur, Crowds, Carnival, and the State in English Executions, in THE
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tory, circumstance, hierarchy, and virtue, leaves no room for claims
that capital punishment was somehow essential to sovereignty.
Eighteenth-century political theory thus cannot be characterized
as a "thanatocracy." John Locke, upon whom Linebaugh relies to assert the existence of a "thanatocracy," is at best ambiguous on the essential relationship between the power to create capital crimes and
political power more generally. But the eighteenth century was not
dominated by John Locke. Rival thinkers, including Edmund Burke
discussed above, also developed political theories that asserted no essential relationship between capital punishment and sovereignty.
2.

Tyburn, Theater, and Thanatocracy

On the level of political theory, therefore, Linebaugh's claim is
unproven. But Linebaugh's "thanatocracy" has a second element that
must also be confronted, namely, the assertion that the "drama" of
execution had the effect of consolidating the power of the ruling
classes)' 3 Thus, one might claim that even if eighteenth-century
political theorists did not articulate the intellectual foundations of
"thanatocracy," such a "thanatocracy" might still exist in practice,
since ruling-class power was thereby enhanced. The evidence, however, fails to bear out this claim.
This drama had, according to Linebaugh, three acts: the trial,
the procession to the gallows, and the actual hanging. Each act, Linebaugh contends, served the purposes of the ruling class. The Old Bailey, where the criminal trials of London took place, was a "theatre"
whose "costuming, make-up, and staging" 1 4 gave the bench the advantage over the defendant. The Old Bailey itself consisted of three
"spaces." The first space, the actual courtroom, was where the trial
was played out. But the other two spaces were important as well: the
second space held the prisoners waiting to have their cases called,
while the third, space "was filled with people who, in being excluded
from an official role in the proceedings, acted as spectators to the
drama of oyer and terminer, but who nevertheless produced a
counter 'hearing and determining' of their own."

15

It was by control-

ling the events that took place in each of these "spaces" that the ruling
class (the "bench") controlled the first act of the drama of Tyburn.
The second act, the procession from Newgate prison, where the
condemned were led to the gallows, was similarly dominated by the
ruling class. In fact, Linebaugh describes the procession to Tyburn as
not only a drama, but as a "cultural battle."" 6 Although condemned
113
114
115

116
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Id. at 83.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 215.

supra note 1, at xvii-xviii.
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prisoners used the parade to Tyburn as a last opportunity to drink and
revel (gin and ale were frequently consumed in large quantities along
the route), religious leaders like John Wesley used the parade as a
means of stressing the importance of sobriety and spiritual submission.11 7 A contest was thus played out between "antinomianism" and
the "work ethic," but the outcome was foreordained, since prisoners
nearly invariably arrived at the gallows.
And it was at the gallows that the final and most compelling act in
the drama took place: the actual execution of the condemned. The
execution ritual would begin with sermons preaching the awfulness of
God's justice and the promise of his mercy. The condemned was then
afforded the opportunity to speak his final words to the assembled
crowd.1 18 The condemned would then be hanged. A struggle sometimes then ensued over possession of the dead body. Judges were empowered to deny burial to particularly heinous criminals and instead
to have their bodies turned over to the London medical schools for
anatomization.1 9 But where the crowd disapproved of a particular
hanging, as in the legendary case of Jack Sheppard,1 20 the crowd
would express its outrage by trying to seize the body. 12' Sometimes, as
in the case of Sheppard, the crowd might even succeed in preventing
anatomization.
This ritual was meant to consolidate the power of the ruling class
and so perpetuate the thanatocracy. 12 2 In making this claim for the
"theater" of ruling-class justice, Linebaugh both depends on and
builds upon a foundation laid by Douglas Hay. 123 Hay has argued that
the "theater" of capital punishment served "hegemonic" and "legitimating" functions. 124 English criminal law in the eighteenth century,
Hay contends, was extremely ritualistic and formalistic. The English
gentry, which by and large controlled the judiciary, made scrupulous
observance of procedure a prerequisite and frequently acquitted defendants for breaches of procedure. But, Hay continues, this preoccu117

Id. at 214-15. It is a mistake to see, as Linebaugh does, the rise of Methodism

narrowly as part of the "class struggle" of eighteenth-century London. Methodism
originated from the desire of some to "reform" the eighteenth-century English church. Its

ascetic practices were designed to achieve salvation, not develop "work-discipline." See ELIE
HALEvY, THE BIRTH OF METHODISM IN ENGLAND (1971); HENRY D. RACK, REASONABLE ENTHUSIAST: JOHN WESLEY AND THE RISE OF METHODISM 1-42 (2d ed. 1992).
118
See Laqueur, supra note 112, at 319-21.

119

See Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:

CRIME AND SocIETY INEIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter ALBioN's FATAL TREE].

121

supra note 1, at 39.
Id. (citing Linebaugh, supra note 119).

122

Id. at xix-xxi.

123

Linebaugh makes his reliance on Hay explicit at id. at xx.

120

THE LONDON HANGED,

124 See generally Douglas Hay, Power,Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL
TREE, supra note 119, at 17-63.
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pation with "procedural justice" was only for show. The ruling class
had in fact developed an ideology built around the "rule of law," and
the excessive use of formality, acted out in the theater of the courtroom and gallows, was necessary to plant this ideology firmly in the
hearts and minds of English men and women. In this way, the ideol12 5
ogy of the rule of law became "legitimated."
Several replies to this argument are possible. One might assert
that the doctrine of hegemony and "legitimacy," upon which both
Hay and Linebaugh rely, commits the logical fallacy of assuming what
it is attempting to prove. 126 One might also contend that the evidence
of actual English criminal trials of the eighteenth century, far from
demonstrating the law to have been a tool of ruling-class power, actually demonstrates that most judgments were arrived at after good-faith
consideration of evidence and law. 127 But the most centrally damaging objection to Linebaugh's claims is the argument advanced recently by Thomas Laqueur that the whole process of public executions
could not have possibly functioned as a theater of state power. 128 According to Laqueur there was simply too much "slippage" in the English execution ritual for it to be an effective device for consolidating
power. As Laqueur puts it:
The hangings and beheadings of seventeenth-, eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century England were unpromising vehicles for the cerId. at 32-34, 55-56 (discussing hegemony, legitimation and law).
John Langbein has replied to this method of historical argumentation:
A staple of Marxist argumentation for dealing with contrary evidence is
what I call the legitimation trick. Evidence that cuts against the thesis is
dismissed as part of a sub-plot to make the conspiracy more palatable to its
victims, to legitimate it. The Hay essay [Power, Authority, and the Criminal
Law] contains some splendid examples. Hay notices the pervasive legalism
of English criminal procedure, including the "extreme solicitude ofjudges
for the rights of the accused.., a sharp distinction from the usual practice
of continental benches." Hay also mentions the tradition of strict construction against penal statutes and the recurrent quashing of strong prosecution cases for technical flaws. But Hay undertakes to reconcile this
attention to safeguard with his thesis by arguing: "When the ruling class
acquitted men on technicalities they helped instill a belief in the disembodied justice of the law in the minds of all who watched. In short, its very
inefficiency, its absurd formalism, was part of its strength as ideology."
Now the question that comes to mind is, simply, how does one test that
proposition? A revealing manner, I think, is to hypothesize the exact opposite facts. Suppose that the rulers of eighteenth-century England had been
operating banana-republic courts, coercing confessions or lynching paupers without trial. Obviously, the ruling-class conspiracy would be equally
well evidenced. I have to ask, therefore, what kind of thesis it is that can be
satisfied by any state of the evidence, and my answer is that it is not a thesis
about the evidence, which means that it is not a thesis about history as I
understand the discipline.
SeeJohn H. Langbein, Albion's FatalFlaws, 98 PAST AND PRESENT 96, 114 (1983).
127
See infra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
128
See Laqueur, supra note 112, at 309.
125
126
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emonial display of power, if by this is meant the sovereign power of
the state. They were more risible than solemn as they lurched chaotically between death and laughter. As often as not, executions
were, and were known to be, utter disasters as "imposing demonstrations" of authority, religious or secular. They were held in unprepossessing locations, with little attention to dramatic detail and
many opportunities for generic slippage. Executions were the most
aleatory of occasions and those responsible did very little to make
them otherwise, to insure the triumph of a prescribed interpretation. The state seemed to show a perverse lack of interest in the
solemnity of hangings and in making its presence decently manifest.
On the contrary, it perpetrated the shabbiest of rituals with the minimum of authorial control. Considerable evidence suggests too that
those who watched the deaths of criminals and traitors understood
the bodies of the condemned in very different ways from what the
state might have intended. The script, the staging and the public's
response were thus all wrong if the point of executions was to put
on "an imposing demonstration of the state's might and authority
played out at the grass roots level." Some, or indeed even the majority, might have skirted dramatic disaster, but any such success was
due more to accident than to authorial competence.
Tyburn itself, where the great proportion of London executions took place, was the unlikeliest of venues for displaying the
power of the state. The gallows from which a world power launched
its criminals into eternity was just outside a barnyard .... 129
Laqueur musters a wealth of evidence to support this thesis: Foreign
visitors to England frequently remarked on the lack of solemnity that
attended English executions; 3 0 the condemned frequently refused to

129

Id. at 309-11 (citations omitted). Some eighteenth-century writers shared La-

queur's estimation of the English execution ritual. Henry Fielding, the dramatist who assisted in the development of the Bow Street magistracy, a precursor to the formation of a
professional police force, argued that capital punishment was ineffective in England precisely because the necessary dramatic elements were lacking. The procession to Tybum
was not a fear-inspiring exercise of state power; rather the condemned's "Procession to
Tyburn, and his last Moments there, are all triumphant; attended with the Compassion of
the meek and tender-hearted, and with the Applause, Admiration, and Envy of all the bold
and hardened." HENRY FIELDING, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE LATE INCREASE OF
ROBBERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 167 (Malvin R. Zirker ed., 1988). Fielding went on to argue
that private executions would be more effective thanpublic ones because private execu-

tions could promote the dread needed to deter the commission of capital crimes. Id, at
169-71. Cf Gayle K Swanson, Henry Fieldingand 'A Certain Wooden Edifice' Called the Gallows,
in EXECUTIONS AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 17TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY- A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 45, 52-54 (William B. Thesing ed., 1990) (exploring Fielding's arguments that the death penalty, as administered, failed as a deterrent).
130 See Laqueur, supra note 112, at 313-14.
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play their "part;"' 3' and the crowd, far from being awestruck at the
3 2
spectacle, tended to treat it as a sort of light entertainment.1
One can thus conclude that Linebaugh has failed to prove the
existence of a "thanatocracy" at the heart of the eighteenth-century
English practice of capital punishment. English political theory did
not make capital punishment central to its definition of sovereignty.
The "drama" of public execution did not serve to consolidate the
power of the ruling class. Tyburnography, with its rich and detailed
portrayal of the London hanged, is ultimately betrayed by a theoretical framework that does not work.
II
MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW

Peter Linebaugh's treatment of "Tyburnography" and
"thanatocracy" is thus distorted by his use of a Marxist framework.
While the laboring classes of eighteenth-century London were certainly treated harshly, and capital punishment clearly served as a
means of keeping order among the working class, it is wrong to use
Marxist categories to explain these actions. Similarly, it is a mistake to
argue that eighteenth-century political thought constituted a
thanatocracy. This sort of reductionism does a disservice to the diversity and complexity of political opinions that prevailed in eighteenthcentury Britain.
But Linebaugh's reliance on Marxist analysis results in more than
simple distortions of the historical record. Important aspects of the
story of eighteenth-century capital punishment are thereby omitted or
obscured. In this section of the review, three themes that are minimized by Linebaugh's Marxist framework will be briefly discussed, in
order to suggest avenues of further research into the issue of capital
punishment in eighteenth-century London. These are: (1) the relationship of religious belief to capital punishment; (2) the growth of
transportation as an alternative to capital punishment; and (3) the
independence and integrity of those who had a role to play in the
criminal-justice system.
A.

Religion and Capital Punishment

A large anomaly exists in the evidence Linebaugh adduces for
"Tyburnography": His chief source, the Ordinary of Newgate's Account, is an explicitly religious document, yet Linebaugh fails to ex131 Id. at 317-20.
132 Id. at 323-24. Laqueur would prefer to see the execution ritual as a "carnival of
spirited death and mockery" that reinforced traditional conceptions of English community. Id. at 354.
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amine the religious background that informed the drafting of that
document. Even a brief consideration of the religious beliefs that
helped to shape eighteenth-century thought on capital punishment
indicates that religion, not class warfare, provides a potentially more
fruitful resource for explaining the proliferation and operation of the
133
death penalty.
The Ordinary of Newgate, also known as the "Bishop of the
Cells," has been described as "lending religious sanction to the gallows."' 34 The chaplain to the condemned of Newgate Prison and invariably a member of the Anglican Church, the Ordinary was charged
with the spiritual welfare of those about to be put to death. He would
preach to the condemned, lead them in liturgy, and attempt to ex1 35
tract from them signs of repentance.
In fact, the Ordinary was part of what might more broadly be
called a theology of capital punishment. Randall McGowen, in particular, has argued that capital punishment in Hanoverian England was
surrounded by a whole set of theological beliefs. He reached this conclusion through a study of the sermons preached at the assizes where
capital sentences were imposed. Several recurrent themes are prominent in this sermon literature. First, God was seen as the ultimate
source of governmental power; the administration of human justice
was "part of God's wider and ultimately beneficial arrangement of the
world." 36 Second, recourse to religion allowed judges and magistrates to reconcile two sometimes conflicting impulses: 'Justice and
Mercy."' 37 As McGowen puts it: "The ministers [who preached the
assize sermons] encouraged the magistrates to use their judgment in
finding the balance between the two.'
133

38

Finally, death and hell were

Randall McGowen has recently studied the contents of sermons preached at the

assizes empowered to impose the death sentence. McGowen has found that: "The sermons remind us that what was a ceremony of state was still very much a religious ceremony
as well.... The sermons evoked emotions, proposed images, and offered scriptural authority to justify the justice that was to follow. They sought to instruct; they also endowed
justice with a sacramental aura." Randall McGowen, 'He Beareth Not the Sword in Vain. Religion and the Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Centuty England, 21 EiGHTEENTH-CENTrURY STUDIES
192, 193 (1987-1988) [hereinafter McGowen, 'HeBeareth Not the Sword in Vain]. Cf Randall
McGowen, The ChangingFaceof God'sJustice, in 9 CRIMINALJUSTICE HISTORY 63, 64 (Louis A.
Knafla et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter McGowen, The ChangingFace](asserting that"religious
principles had an important and independent role to play in influencing legal history,"
including the history of capital punishment in England).
134

See HARRY POTTER, HANGING IN JUDGMENT:

RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN

ENGLAND 18 (1993). While Potter's book is largely focused on nineteenth- and twentiethcentury movements to abolish the death penalty, its opening chapters are nevertheless
useful for setting the religious context within which eighteenth-century capital punishment
was carried out.
135 See Linebaugh, supra note 2, at 250-52.
136 See McGowen, 'He Beareth Not the Sword in Vain, supra note 133, at 196.
137
138

Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
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crucial to the whole didactic purpose of the sermon: through concentration on the torments of hell that awaited malefactors, others might
39
be led to salvation.'
An awareness of the theology of capital punishment might account for a number of anomalies in the history of executions in England. Perhaps the most serious anomaly is that at the same time one
sees a huge increase in the number of capital offenses (from around
fifty in 1688 to perhaps over 200 by the year 1800), the execution rate
actually decreased. 140 Linebaugh dismisses this anomaly as unimportant to his concerns, preferring to try to fit it within the framework of
his "thanatocracy."'

4

1

A knowledge of theological developments, however, permits one
to explain this anomaly. English law had been generally transformed
as a result of the English Revolution. 42 Theologically, the revolutionaries, many of whom were Puritan, introduced a new concept of sin
into England. Roman Catholic theology had traditionally divided all
sin into two large categories, mortal and venial. Mortal sin was sin
that was intrinsically deadly. One would, at least so far as the external
forum was concerned, be understood as automatically condemned to
hell for committing a single mortal sin. One would not, however, be
condemned to hell for committing a venial sin. Rather, one would be
required to make satisfaction in purgatory. Robert Bellarmine, for instance, explained venial sins by stating that they "deserved temporal
punishment only." Further, although a mortal sin directly violated the
law of God, a venial sin, in contrast, constituted a lesser offense occurring "outside the law" (praeter legem).

14 3

Puritan theology (and Anglican theology under the influence of
Puritanism) challenged this distinction. Anglican and Puritan theologians stressed the intrinsic deadliness of all, even the slightest, sins.
All sinful action could lead to hell. 144 Such a theology, however,

139

140
141
142

Id. at 201-02.
See 1 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 78, at 3-5.
See supra text accompanying note 99.
See Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 569,

598-613 (1984). Berman has persuasively argued that English law was fundamentally transformed by the "Puritan Revolution" of the mid-seventeenth century: "I propose a different
view [from that commonly held by historians of English law], namely that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there were fundamental changes in the English legal
system as a whole, including not only its constitutional aspects but also its criminal and civil
aspects .... " Id. at 599. The following argument is indebted to Berman's insights into the
fundamental transformation worked by the Puritans on English law.
143
See H. R.McADoo, THE STRUCTURE OF CAROLINE MORAL THEOLOGY 98-99 (1949).
144

See THOMAS WOOD, ENGLISH CASUISTICAL DIVINrrY DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CEN-

TURY wITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JEREMY TAYLOR

120-26 (1952).
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might lead to despair. 14 5 To prevent despair, some theologians distinguished between "sins of willfulness" and "sins of infirmity." Sins of
willfulness were committed in full knowledge that what one was doing
was wrong, while sins of infirmity were committed because of some
intrinsic weakness on the part of the individual. 146 Other theologians,
meanwhile, stressed that while all sin was deadly, one might be saved
through appropriate repentance. 147
At the risk of speculating somewhat, it is possible to see these
distinctions in moral theology reflected in eighteenth-century criminal law. A vast range of wrongful conduct comes to be seen as
"deadly" in a quite literal sense: capital punishment is the prescribed
means of dealing with an expanding array of transgressors. But at the
same time, the weakness of individual defendants and the defendant's
48
repentance are taken into consideration when imposing sentence.
These sentencing practices likely represent a transfer of beliefs from
the theological realm to the legal, and is in keeping with Harold
Berman's observation that "virtually every law-making regime in the
history of mankind has wanted its laws not only to advance its interests
but also to reflect its ideas of rightness and ofjustice." 49 One should
not be surprised, accordingly, to see deadly sin (now understood to
encompass a great many types of wrongdoing) punished capitally.
B.

Capital Punishment and Transportation

To understand the role capital punishment played in eighteenthcentury London, one must also understand the functions filled by
benefit of clergy and transportation. Benefit of clergy was a legal device that had its origin in the conflicts between "Church" and "State"
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 50 As a means of ensuring the
clergy's right to be tried by ecclesiastical courts, English law provided
that anyone capable of reciting the 51st Psalm (the "neck verse")
could not be sentenced to death in the royal courts.' 51 The presumption was that only clergymen could read. By the closing years of the
seventeenth century, however, this device had become a well-worn
legal fiction. It could be asserted by a defendant not actually in orders
145 See generally C. FitzSimons Allison, The PastoralCruelty ofJeremy Taylor's Theology, 15
THE MODERN CHURCHMAN 123, 128-29 (1972) (arguing that if a sinful person with low selfesteem is unable to redeem himself, secularism would be a more attractive alternative).
146 See McADoo, supra note 143, at 114-18; WooD, supra note 144, at 123.
147 See McADoo, supra note 143, at 120-37. A helpful recent overview of some of the
issues implicated in Caroline moral theology is found at JOHN SPURR, THE RESTORATION
CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 1646-1689, at 279-375 (1991).
148
See Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial, supra note 3, at 47-55.
149
150

See Berman, supra note 142, at 571.

See

HAROLD

J. BERMAN,

LAW AND REVOLUTION:

LEGAL TRADrnON 255-69 (1983).
151 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note

1, at 53.
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only once; 152 it was available to women, who, theologically, could not
153
be ordained, and so were unable to join the ranks of the clergy;
and, finally, it was unavailable to those convicted of many of the newer
54
statutory offenses.'
A strange tension accordingly existed in the criminal law of the
time. On the one hand, there was a growing number of criminal statutes the violation of which was punished capitally; but on the other
hand, a guilty party might be released with no more punishment than
branding on the thumb (done to prove that someone had already had
his or her "clergy") if he or she succeeded in reciting the 51st Psalm.
Judges had long manipulated benefit of clergy as a means of
preventing unacceptably large numbers of persons from being
hanged. 155 This manipulation, however, had its drawbacks, since it
resulted in the freeing of prisoners who were deserving of at least
some punishment. Judges began to remedy this situation beginning
in the 1660s. One finds in the records instances in which judges denied benefit of clergy to parties who, although unable to read, might
nevertheless have been "clergied" under the older, more liberal approach. But instead of being hanged, these individuals were offered
the possibility of a royal pardon conditioned on accepting transportation to the American or Caribbean colonies. 15 6
With the enactment of the Transportation Act of 1718, transportation was officially established as an alternative to capital punishment. In London, transportation immediately proved to be a popular
alternative and in fact, far more felons were transported than were
hanged in London for most of the period Linebaugh has considered.
Roger Ekirch has established that in the period 1718-1769, 69.5% of
convicted felons were transported to America, while only 15.5% were
hanged (the remainder were given lesser punishments).1 57
One must always be wary of criticizing an author for not writing a
different book. But certainly an account of the London hanged
would be enriched by an examination of (or at least a comparison
with) the London transported.' 5 8 Who was transported? Why? How
did the transported differ from the hanged? Can a comparison reveal
152
153
154

SeeJOHN M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND,
Id.

1660-1800, at 142 (1986).

Id. at 143.
See Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Tria, supra note 3, at 38-41.
156 See BEATTE, supra note 152, at 472-73.
157 See EKIRCH, supra note 103, at 21. See also PETER W. CoLDmtA , EMiGRANTS IN CHAINS,
1607-1776 (1992); ABBOT E. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVrruDE AND CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA, 1607-1776 (1947).
155

158 Transportation receives only glancing treatment in THE LONDON HANGED. See, for
instance, Linebaugh's brief discussion ofJames White who was sentenced to be transported
to the American colonies, in THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 153-54; see also supra
text accompanying notes 58-59.
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anything about the deeper role of criminal law in English society?
These are important questions that go largely unasked and
unanswered.
C.

The Integrity and Independence of the Criminal Process

Finally, Linebaugh's Marxist framework caricatures the criminal
process. At least four groups of individuals had significant roles to
play in the eighteenth-century criminal prosecution: (1) judges; (2)
juries; (3) prosecutors (distinct from counsel); and (4) counsel. All
four groups have their integrity and independence either implicitly or
explicitly impugned in an account that sees them more as unwitting
class warriors than as conscientious participants in a process that
might involve the taking of human life. Each group of actors will be
briefly considered.
1. Judges
Judges come in for only brief mention in The London Hanged. We
learn that the judges who presided at the Old Bailey session ofJanuary
1715 "were not as bad as some who had recently served the re160
gime."1 59 We further learn that judges tended to dominate jurors,
and, we learn in particular that Lord Mansfield, respected for his contributions to commercial law, "was both feared and hated in eighteenth-century London."'16 1 Linebaugh premises his brief treatment of
judges on his belief that they were knowledgeable participants in the
class struggle.
But this is not a fair portrayal of the English judiciary. A bold
standard of integrity was set for modern English judiciary by the seventeenth-century judge Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676). Hale was a man
with well-developed notions ofjustice and a deep commitment to the
law.' 62 First appointed to the bench in 1653, Hale took especially seriously his responsibility in capital cases. His sense of responsibility
comes through with particular clarity in a diary he kept while on circuit, which has only recently been edited and published. 163 Among
the admonitions Hale felt it necessary to keep in mind when judging
capital cases were the following:
That he [the judge] avoid all precipitancy and haste in examining,
censuring, judging, [that he] pause and consider, turn every stone,
159
160
161

162
163

THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1,at 77.
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 360.
See generally EDMUND HEWARD, MATrrHEWv HALE (1972).
This diary has been edited and published in MaijaJansson, Matthew Hale on fudges

and Judging, 9 J. LEGAL HisT. 201 (1988). I am grateful to Harold J. Berman for this
reference.
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weigh every question, every answer, every circumstance, follow the
wise direction of Moses in a case of importance to inquire, ask, diligently inquire, behold if it be true and the thing be certain; all the
senses, all the methods of disquisition are little enough in cases of
great moment or difficulty, especially where a man can err but
once.... If upon the best inquisition a man can make, the scales are
very near even or if it stands near a measuring case the sentence or
direction of absolution is fitter to be given than the sentence of condemnation tutius probate in mise[re]cordiaquam in severitate [since it is
proven to be safer to err on the side of sympathy than severity] especially where the sentence is ultimum supplicium [capital], for though
to condemn the innocent and to acquit the guilty are both abomination unto to God, yet that is where a sufficient evidence of guilt
appears, but in obscuris et in evidgntibus praesumiturpro innocentia [innocence is presumed where the evidence is obscure] and I had
rather through ignorance of the truth of the fact or the unevidence
164
of it acquit ten guilty persons than condemn one innocent.
Doubtless, few eighteenth-century judges could live up to the standard
set by their predecessor Matthew Hale. Even so, the evidence indicates that judges tried, for the most part, to conduct trials in a fairminded way, careful to take into account the defendant's disadvanta-

geous position. 165 Thus, the evidence does not support Linebaugh's
premise that a large number ofjudges used their office as a means of
advancing the interests of a particular class.
2. Juries

As in the case ofjudge8, Linebaugh tells his readers relatively littie about juries. We are told that jurors had relatively little indepen-

dence vis d vis the bench; 166 and that many, perhaps most, jurors
came from the class of small property, owners, a group particularly
vulnerable to the economic manipulations of the well-to-do.' 67 Linebaugh broadly suggests that individual jurors, and even entire panels,
were usually corrupt. 168 Despite their economic vulnerability and
164

Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted). Elsewhere in this diary Hale wrote:

Yet even in relation to those offenses that require the severest animadversion and punishment I shall exercise it still with a compassionate heart
even to those very malefactors that shall stiffer under the severest sentence:
that while I exercise my office as ajudge in punishment of the offense, yet I
may not forget that common humanity that is fit to be shown to the offenders and, therefore, ever to avoid insolence, passion, intemperance, or unevenness and unequality of mind or deportment in what I do herein.
Id. at 209.
165 See, for instance, Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century CriminalTrial supra note
3, at 31-55.
166 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 83-84.
167 Id. at 78-79.
168 Id. at 83-84. Linebaugh makes much of"ancientjurymen" or "standingjurors" who
served regularly on jury panels, sometimes for years on end. Linebaugh suggests that long
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their frequent corruption, however, Linebaugh indicates that juries
quite often acquitted defendants or engaged in "pious perjury," by
reducing capital offenses to non-capital offenses, typically by downvaluing the items allegedly stolen. 16 9 Linebaugh ignores the apparent
anomaly of a dependent and sycophantic jury system routinely acquit1 70
ting or reducing charges.
Several important studies of eighteenth-century jury practice are
now available. 17 1 These studies suggest a more nuanced picture than
Linebaugh provides his readers. In the early period of Linebaugh's
account (roughly up to 1735), jurors were under the substantial control of the judge, who might comment on the evidence and even in
rare instances overrule a verdict of acquittal.' 7 2 After 1735, as an adversary process became more evident in the courts, judges were less
inclined to dominate proceedings than before, but could still exercise
73
substantial control in given cases.'
While juries did not then enjoy the independence they have acquired in the last two centuries, their integrity was not thereby necessarily compromised. Substantial evidence has established that juries,
for the most part, operated in a "principled"17 4 fashion in arriving at
verdicts. Recent studies suggest that the portrait Linebaugh
sketches-of jurors who might, for instance, sentence defendants to
hang simply because they have grown hungry and irritable' 7 5-is in
substantial measure a caricature. Jurors were aware of the power over
life and death that they held and were generally unwilling to abuse
it.1 7 6
service resulted in corruption in the sense that veteran jurors convicted more readily than
inexperienced ones. Id. at 84. In reviewing the pattern of convictions in Essex, however,
Peter King has reached the opposite conclusion: "One theory sometimes advanced by
modem commentators-that older and more experienced jurors are much less likely to
acquit than young and inexperienced ones-receives no support from the Essex verdict
patterns of the late eighteenth century." PeterJ. R. King, "IlliteratePlebeians,Easily Misled":
Jury Composition, Experience, and Behavior in Essex, 1735-1815, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND
TRUE: THE CRIMNIMA. TRIAL IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800, at 254, 289-90 (J. S. Cockburn &
Thomas A. Green eds., 1988) (citations omitted).
THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 83-85.
169
170

Id.
See THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGUSH CRIMINALJURY, 1200-1800 (1985); TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 168;
171

Peter King, Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1800, 27
THE Hisr. J. 25 (1984); Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, supra note 3.
172 See Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, supra note 3, at 284-300.
173 Id. at 307-14.
174 Concerning Essex, King has stated: "Although it is difficult to uncover the underlying criteria that influenced these highly selective processes [of convicting or acquitting], it

is evident that these were principled decisions." King, supra note 168, at 255 (citations
omitted).
175 THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 83.
176 See Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Tria supra note 3, at 52-55.
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Prosecutors

In the days before professional police, London (like the rest of
England) relied upon a baffling series of ad hoc measures to bring
miscreants to justice. Undergirding most schemes, however, was the
basic premise that the victims of crime would privately bring criminal
prosecutions.
Linebaugh attacks the legitimacy of this premise, arguing that the
reward system, which Parliament began to construct beginning in the
1690s as a means of inducing private individuals to bring criminal
177
complaints, was irredeemably corrupt.
Linebaugh substantially hits the mark with this charge. The reward system encouraged the creation of networks of "thief-takers,"
who were supposed to serve the court as professional informants.
Often, however, these "informants" functioned instead as "set-up" artists who specialized in entrapping inexperienced or even totally innocent parties. 178
But other groups were also interested in law enforcement. The
eighteenth century saw the growth of a nearly unique type of organization, the private prosecution association. Originating in all likelihood
in the late seventeenth-century Societies for the Reformation of Manners, 179 private prosecution associations performed both investigative
and prosecutorial functions. Many associations set their fee schedules
on a sliding scale to allow those to join who otherwise might not have
been able to afford membership.18 0
Alternatively, individuals, acting alone, might also bring criminal
charges. Where individuals did bring charges, the threat of a substantial fine compelled their appearance in court. Irrespective of whether
charges were brought by a prosecution association or a private party,
the entire system of private prosecution was designed in part to discourage "self-serving" prosecutions. 1 8 1

177

THE LONDON HANGED, supra note 1, at 27-28, 52-54.
Commencing in the 1690s, Parliament created a scheme of statutory rewards for
the apprehension and conviction of felons that had the effect of inducing groups to organ178

ize to profit from the rewards. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit:
Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 572-80 (1990).
179 See T. C. Curtis & W. A. Speck, The Societies for the Reformation of Manners: A Case
Study in the Theory and Practiceof Moral Reform, 3 Lrr. & HisT. 45 (1976); see alsoJ. H. OVER.
TON, LIFE IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH, 1660-1714, at 213-16 (1885).
180 See, e.g., PeterJ. R. King, ProsecutionAssociations and TheirImpact in Eighteenth-Century
Essex, in POuCING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 171, 179 (Douglas Hay &

Francis Snyder eds., 1989).
181 See Langbein, supra note 126, at 102.
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Counsel

Linebaugh has virtually nothing to say about the role of counsel
in criminal trials. Yet, according to Stephan Landsman, the very period he is documenting gave rise to the adversarial process. Counsel
began to take an active role in defending those accused of felonies
and began to practice some of those trial techniques we in the late
twentieth century take very much for granted-such as conducting
cross-examination and objecting to violations of the rules of
182
evidence.
Counsel was hardly available to all those accused of serious
wrongdoing, but the evidence nevertheless suggests large numbers of
defendants took advantage of lawyers' services, especially from midcentury onward. Where counsel was not present, the court took on
some of the burden of assisting the accused with defense. The emergence of counsel served as an important quality control on the integrity of the eighteenth century criminal trial. Counsel increasingly
tested the veracity of witnesses;'8 3 courts sharpened and enforced
rules of evidence; 8 4 and the participants in the process found themselves challenged in new ways to render verdicts faithful to both evidence and law.' 8 5 In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a
thoroughly corrupt judicial system operating on behalf of the class
interests of the elite.
III
MARXIST HIsToRIoGRAPHY AND THE RuLE OF LAw
As suggested above, Marxist legal scholars differ over whether it is
possible or useful to speak of "the rule of law."18 6 Linebaugh himself
believes that one can avoid this "antinomy" by focusing on the persons
who were actually hanged at Tybum. 18 7 Nevertheless, Linebaugh
seems to operate under the presumption that law in eighteenth-century England was mere "superstructure," and that lawyers and judges
were engaged in class oppression rather than in the search for

justice.

188

182
See generally Landsman, supra note 178 (discussing the prominent role played by
counsel in the new English adversarial system of the eighteenth century).
183
Id. at 535-37, 539-43, 548-57.
184 Id. at 564-72.
185
Landsman states: "The adversary method was created by judges and lawyers who
sought.., to build a more equitable court system. They were concerned not only that
there be appropriate adjudications, but 'that the Publick may be satisfied, that no unfair
Practices have been made use of.'" Id. at 603 (footnotes omitted).
186 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

188

See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
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Testing the proposition that eighteenth-century lawyers and
judges were primarily engaged "in the search forjustice" is beyond the
scope of this review. I will, however, briefly discuss a related issue: the
nature of the disagreement between Marxist legal scholars (and critical legal scholars more generally) on the one hand, and (how to put
it?) "orthodox," "mainstream," "establishment" scholars on the other
hand regarding the rule of law. Such an inquiry might at least yield
criteria by which to judge the adequacy of eighteenth-century jurists'
concern for justice.
A significant part of contemporary critical legal scholarship has
for its purpose the exposition of what might be called the "false neutrality" of the law. This endeavor may be roughly sketched in a few
broad strokes. The consensus jurisprudence of the post-World War II
era believed that law was a "neutral" enterprise. 8 9 This jurisprudence
stressed procedure and the "institutional settlement" of legal controversies, and placed confidence in widespread political agreement as a
means of transcending debates over the substantive content of law. 190
This trust in process, however, was misplaced. In truth, the law
contained implicit value judgments and political stances that were
(improperly) obscured by the predisposition to claim the neutral
highground. 19 1 One purpose of the critical movement was to expose
1 92
this false neutrality through devices such as "trashing."'
On this view, the concept of the rule of law is itself simply another
"false neutrality." These critics propose that the concept originated in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England as a device for controlling the great mass of people without recourse to a police force or
standing army. 93 It proved so successful as a means of social control
that even opponents of the "ruling classes" came to frame their complaints in the language of the law.
This is essentially the position that Linebaugh takes, though he
does not make it consistently clear that he is doing so. Using "neutrality" as a sort of straw figure, Linebaugh challenges the legitimacy of
English law; he hopes to discredit that law by proving that it was the
189 See Gary Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950s, 21 U. MicH.J.L. REF. 561 (1988) (situating the emergence of process-oriented jurisprudence in the culture of the 1950s). Cf
Earl M. Maltz, CriticalTheoy, NeutralPrinciples, and the Future of Legal Scholarship,43 FLA. L.

REv. 445 (1991) (defending legal scholarship against infusions of political ideology).
190
See Peller, supra note 189.
191 Id. at 566-72. Cf Mark G. Kelman, Emerging CentristLiberalism, 43 FLA. L. REv. 417,
420-21 (1991) (examining the core beliefs and influences affecting post-war process
scholars).
192
See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing,36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984).
193
See Douglas Hay, supra note 124, at 26-56. It is a mistake to see the rule of law as
originating in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England. For its eleventh- and twelfthcentury origins, see Berman, supra note 150, at 292-94.
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product of a "thanatocracy" out to protect its interest in property. 9 4
According to Linebaugh, judges like Lord Mansfield and a host of less
eminent figures were merely agents of class oppression acting under
cover of "ideology" and not the "neutral" decision-makers they should
195
have been.
Some scholars have responded to works such as Linebaugh's by
reasserting the need to maintain the old consensus. 196 Many scholars,
however, have attempted to move beyond this argument by asserting
the need to examine more closely the issue of the goods toward which
the law is oriented. John Finnis is one such thinker. 9 7 At the risk of
oversimplication, I will attempt a thumbnail sketch of Finnis's
scholarship.
Finnis's jurisprudence is grounded on analytical and Aristotelian
premises and is rooted in what he takes to be "the basic forms of the
human good."' 9 8 Finnis takes as essential to human existence the
goods of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion. Finnis's theory ofjustice builds from
these basic goods a theory of the common good. The common good
consists, for Finnis, in "the flourishing of all members of the community."' 99 While Finnis recognizes a basic right to private property, he
argues that the possession of property should be subordinated to the
common good. Owners of private property, for instance, are under a
duty to put their property to productive use, and to avoid "speculative
acquisition... uncorrelated with any economically productive devel'200
opment or use.
This theory of justice suggests that law, at least in part, arises as a
means of "bring[ing] definition, specificity, clarity, and thus predictability into human interactions." 20 1 The "rule of law" is, in a sense, an
supra note 1, at 50-54.
Id. at 357-60 (discussing Lord Mansfield); see also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, IN DEFENSE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACy 37-46 (1984).
197 SeeJoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) [hereinafter NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RiGHTs]. Finnis did not write this book with the critical legal studies
movement in mind. He has, however, written a profound response to the critical movement. SeeJohn Finnis, On "The CriticalLegal Studies Movement", 30 AM.J.JuIus. 21 (1985). It
must also be noted that Finnis has integrated important insights of Lon Fuller and the
"legal process" movement of 1950s jurisprudence into his theory of law. See NATRAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra, at 273-76.
198 See NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 197, at 86-89. Finnis has further
developed his argument about the basic forms of human goods in MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADIION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 40-44 (1991). Cf Germain Grisez et al., PracticalPrinciples,
Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J. Juusp. 99 (1987) (developing the philosophical
foundations of the basic human goods).
199 NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 197, at 174.
200
Id. at 172.
201
Id. at 268.
194
195
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of
elaboration of these requirements. Finnis proposes a detailed set 202
guidelines for testing a community's adherence to the rule of law.

An unjust law, then, is a law that violates the common good, for any
2 03
one of a number of reasons Finnis specifies at length.
But John Finnis represents only one of a number of approaches
to jurisprudence. One alternative approach is the "integrative jurisprudence" of Harold Berman. Berman's jurisprudence is especially
sensitive to the historical character of law. Harold Berman has identi20 4
fied three factors as essential to an "integrative jurisprudence."
One must consider basic moral principles (i.e., is it right to execute
certain classes of convicted criminals?). But one must also acknowledge that moral principles do not exist in a timeless present or in a
realm divorced from practical judgments and political debate about
what is most useful for society. Accordingly, reflection about whether
the common good is served by capital punishment must also consider
two further factors: historical experience (i.e., in light of our experience, is it fitting to execute certain classes of criminals?) and politics
or utility (i.e., does it serve society's interests to execute certain classes
of criminals?). This sort of analysis seems to be at the heart of the
"evolving standard of decency" test used by the Supreme Court in
205
death penalty cases.
With this as prologue, I will return to the issue of the "false neutrality" of law. The law embodies a host of particular assumptions
about the proper uses and distribution of property, the proper ways to
treat criminals, and the like. The quest to unmask "false neutrality"
202 Id. at 270-76.
203 Id. at 351-68.
204 These three factors are drawn from Harold J. Berman, Toward an IntegrativeJurisprudence: Politics, Morality, Histoy, 76 CAL. L. Rrv. 779, 782 (1988).
205 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)
("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."). Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976) (citing Trop for the above proposition in affirming the imposition of capital
punishment).
LaFave and Scott, in their hornbook on criminal law, quite unreflectively analyze Gregg
v. Georgia in an "integrative" fashion:

As for the question of whether the death penalty is inherently cruel, so as to
constitute a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court
answered in the negative in Gregg v. Georgia. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court emphasized three factors: (i) that the "imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in
the United States and England"; (ii) that it was "now evident that a large
proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appropriate
and necessary criminal sanction"; and (iii) that the death penalty serves
"two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes
by prospective offenders."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 178 (2d ed. 1986).
I hope to return to the historical and jurisprudential commitments embodied in the
"evolving standards of decency" test in a future article.
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might help to stimulate thought about these first principles, but such
a quest has very definite limits. Linebaugh has demonstrated that the
supposedly neutral, legal decision-makers of eighteenth-century English criminal law had some very definite preconceptions about the
value of property and the need to protect it. But is the appropriate
means of analysis the sledgehammer of Marxist thought, or a searching study of the demands of morality, history, and politics in the face
of concrete circumstances?
If one selects the Marxist approach, one is ultimately forced to
call into question the legitimacy of the legal system one is studying.
This is what Linebaugh has done. But if one takes as one's startingpoint an integrative analysis, or an analysis of the demands of the common good, one is led to a much more promising set of questions: Is a
particular legal institution, like capital punishment, just? Does its continued usage conform to the experiences of a particular community?
Does it represent sound public policy?
Establishing some criteria by which to judge the judges and jurors
of eighteenth-century England can also be instructive. These criteria
should be shaped by reflection on the common good as understood
by eighteenth-century men and women. Did judges or jurors exalt
private or personal advantage over broader conceptions of the public
welfare? Did they decide cases, especially capital cases, on whim or
caprice? Or did they engage in searching analyses of law and facts,
trying to arrive at the legally correct outcome? These are the criteria
by which to judge the conduct of the relevant "decision-makers" of
eighteenth-century English law. Proof that these decision-makers acted in conformity with these criteria would fill a book at least as large
as Linebaugh's. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced in the body of
this review suggests many, if not most, "decision-makers" behaved in a
"principled" fashion, considering cases in accord with the rules. To
be sure, when viewed retrospectively, a system that imposed capital
punishment for minor infractions against property seems like a most
barbaric regime. In fact, many eighteenth-century writers would have
agreed with this assessment.2 0 6 But can the entire system be delegitimated as existing for and perpetuating the advantage of a few? The
case remains unproven.
IV
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS:

TYBURNOGRAPHY TODAY

Linebaugh's findings, and this review's criticisms, can be reduced
to a number of brief propositions. Capital punishment was a routine
206 See generally McGowen, The ChangingFace, supra note 133 (reviewing religiouslybased arguments against the death penalty).
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feature of eighteenth-century London life, even if most convicted
felons were transported rather than hanged. The London hanged
were drawn, nearly exclusively, from the city's working classes. Large
portions of working class London were economically pressed for
much of the eighteenth century, as wages paid in cash eventually substituted for customary rights and privileges. Furthermore, many members of the working class belonged to "oppositional cultures," resistant
to those who made or enforced the law. But while some of those
hanged had merely acted out of economic necessity or opposition to
the prevailing order, the British government was not a "thanatocracy."
Public executions were of doubtful efficacy. The proliferation of capital offenses was not matched with an increase in the rate of executions. Evidence shows thatjudges,jurors, and other "decision-makers"
acted with integrity when considering whether to impose a death sentence. Religious conceptions of sin, responsibility, and reformability
were never far removed from such deliberations, and probably shaped
the outcome of many cases. Political thinkers, Locke and Burke
among them, accepted the death penalty as appropriate in some circumstances, but did not make it an integral part of their thought.
What larger lessons can be drawn from these findings? The most
obvious lesson has to do with the relationship of American law to its
English roots. Like its mother country, the American colonies imposed capital punishment for a variety of offenses. The colonies did
not have a uniform criminal law, and the English common-law of
crimes was adopted selectively by the various jurisdictions.2 0 7 Nevertheless, execution for crimes against property and commerce was
commonplace, as it was for religious and sexual offenses.2 0 8 Over the
course of the late seventeenth and early-to-mid eighteenth centuries,
the types of capital crimes "on the books" expanded steadily. In New
York, for example, the death penalty was imposed for various types of
counterfeiting in a succession of statutes enacted between 1709 and
1766.209

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the states of the
new United States steadily restricted the types of crimes for which capital punishment might be imposed. 2 10 The United States Constitution
and Bill of Rights, however, were framed by men who understood the
death penalty to be a routine feature of criminal law. The Fifth
Amendment is testimony to this assumption when it states that no person may "be deprived of life . . . without due process of law." 21 ' Ac207
208
209

See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4-5 (1991).
See NEGLEY K. TEETERS, HANG BY THE NECK 7-19 (1967).
See PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT

MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861, at 15-16 (1982).
210 See PATERNOSTER, supra note 207, at 6-7.
211
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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cordingly, those who would argue against the death penalty on
constitutional grounds must surmount an obstacle posed by the very
language of the document.2 1 2 In this way, the presumptions of the
eighteenth century remain vital today.
American constitutional law thus continues to be influenced by
some of the beliefs Linebaugh has chronicled. Similarly, the
"demographics" of today's death penalty bear a striking resemblance
to the demographics of the London hanged. A study of those executed in the United States between 1977 and 1990 has shown that the
executed filled "low-skilled positions such as cement finisher, poultry
company worker, handyman, laborer, sawmill worker, migrant worker,
and tirecapper."2 13 A few of those executed had "some training in
blue collar posts,"2 1 4 while only two "had quasi-professional back-

grounds."2 15 Additionally, 39.2% of those executed were African21 6
American, a disproportionately large figure.
Unlike the London hanged, however, the American executed
have been put to death almost entirely for homicide.2 1 7 Furthermore,
many of those executed had lengthy criminal records.2 1 8 As several
commentators have put it, these "are not the type of people the public
'2 1 9
is likely to mourn over.
212
Three United States Supreme CourtJustices, however, have proposed theories of
constitutional interpretation that avoid this issue. SeeWilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Constitutional
Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HAv. L. REv. 313 (1986);
JeffreyJ. Pokorak, "DeathStands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty, 27 CAIW. L. REv. 239 (1991);Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up From Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall
and the Death Penalty, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1131 (1993).
Retired Justice Harry Blackmun has now joined retired Justice Brennan and the late
Justice Marshall in concluding that the death penalty is unconstitutional. See Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf Linda Greenhouse, Death
Penalty is Renounced by Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at Al (providing further detail
regardingJustice Blackmun's dissent); and David von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why
the Death Penalty is Dying, THE WASH. POST, March 6, 1994, at C3 (comparing and contrastingJustice Blackmun's andJustice Scalia's respective approaches to death penalty cases).
213 SeeJohn H. Culver, CapitalPunishment, 1977-1990: Characteristicsof the 143 Executed,
76 Soc. & Soc. REs. 59, 60 (1992).
214

215
216

Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.

Culver states:
The 143 individuals executed over the past fourteen years were convicted of
killing, or being involved in the murders of, 146 adults and 40 adolescents
and children under the age of 18. Further, those executed had previously
been convicted of killing, confessed to killing, or were suspected of killing
an additional 146 adults and five others under the age of 18. If one accepts
as valid the self-reported figures of several of the multiple murderers, those
executed in this 14-year period were collectively responsible for 337
homicides.
Id. at 60.
217

218
219

Id. at 61.

Id. (quoting Robert W.JollyJr. & Edward Sagarin, The FirstEight After Furman: Who
Was Executed With the Return of the Death Penalty?, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 610, 622 (1984)).
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In addition to poverty and a lack ofjob skills, the American condemned have quite typically been raised in what can only be described
as dysfunctional settings. Unemployed parents, parents who abused
drugs or alcohol, parents who separated or divorced, and parents who
beat or otherwise mistreated their children, are all common denominators of most held on death rows. 220 It is well-established that such
22
backgrounds can give rise to a host of psychological disturbances. '
The Supreme Court, however, has given only limited recognition to
family history and psychological disturbance as mitigating factors to
22 2
consider when sentencing a defendant in a capital case.

It is difficult to assert class oppression where the American executed are concerned. Most poor people and most unskilled and semiskilled workers never commit crimes of violence. Most persons who
are raised in troubled families live productive and useful lives themselves. Nevertheless, one senses that in some fashion the nexus of economic deprivation and family dysfunction and violence "hardn'd the
minds" of many of the executed and made them "hate and defy almost all mankind." A good many James Appletons have surely been
223
executed over the years.
One must ask whether the common good is served by executing
such men and women. The affirmative case is clearest where a convicted murderer (or other felon) serving a life-without-parole sentence has killed in prison. Such a murder could be committed with
relative impunity, since no other meaningful sanction is available. To
safeguard the lives of staff and inmates, the offender should be put to
2 24
death.
220 Family dysfunction and its traumatic impact on personality development is a recurrent theme among those interviewed by Doug Magee. SeeSLoW COMING DARMC INTERVIEWS
ON DEATH Row (Doug Magee ed., 1980).
221

See generallyADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS

A CLINICAL DISORDER (1993) (exploring the relationship of crime and psychological disorder); American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENrAL
DISORDERS (3d rev. ed. 1987) (documenting the generally accepted psychopathologies).
222 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (vacating a death sentence
where the court refused to consider defendant's upbringing and emotional disturbance as
mitigating factors). Cf Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the IndividualizationRequirement in CapitalSentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 839-41 (1992)
(attempting to provide greater and more defensible content to the Supreme Court's requirement of "individualized sentencing").
223
See, e.g.,John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1011, 1011-14 (1993) (discussing the case of Robert Alton Harris).
224 This has long been an issue in New York. See Note, Death After Life:The Future of
New York's Mandatory Death Penaltyfor Murders Committed by Life-Term Pisoners,13 FoRDHAm
URB.LJ. 597 (1985) (arguing there should not and cannot be a mandatory death penalty
for life-term prisoners who murder in New York). Cf W.E. Cooper &John King-Farlow, A
Casefor CapitalPunishment, 20J. SOC. PHIL- 64 (Winter 1989) (arguing capital punishment

is morally justified by the protection it extends to the innocent).

1994]

REVIEW ESSAY

1199

Yet it is difficult to imagine other circumstances where the death
sentence might be justified. The point has been put well by Watt
Espy, a leading historian of the death penalty:
[The death penalty] is not a deterrent to crime nor does it restore
life to the victim. It is demoralizing to the population in general in
that it shows a lack of regard for the sanctity of human life by the
State itself. Finally the possibility of error exists and... nothing can
for the state to unbe more terrible or more reprehensible than
2 25
justly take the life of one of its own citizens.

225 M. Watt Espy, The HistoricalPerspectiv4 in SLOW COMING DAIuC INTERVIEWS ON
DFArH Row, supra note 220, at 174. Hugo Adam Bedau has similarly made an eloquent
case against continuance of the death penalty:
[T]he current system of capital punishment entrenches our national obsession with killing people. It teaches the lesson that some may kill others
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation as long as they are the right
people doing it for the right reasons in the right manner. The fact that
such killings are not necessary, that there is a well-established alternative
method of punishment-long-term imprisonment-now used throughout
Europe and in many American jurisdictions for over a century, does not
matter. Defenders of the death penalty insist that the killings they favor are
justified, desirable, legal, authorized-and therefore are "necessary." Besides, we are told, those who are condemned to die by the death penalty are
less than human. Their conduct and their histories prove that they are not
like us, and they have done unspeakable things for which there is no forgiveness or repentance; they deserve our righteous indignation. Any refusal on our part to put them to death is proof of our own failure of nerve.
Thus do we extend the reign of Thanatos, the god of death.
See Hugo A. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Yesterday and Today, 95 DicI. L. REv. 759,
768 (1991).

